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Abstract
We examine dynamic coupling and feedback effects between High Frequency
Traders (HFTs) and how they can destabilize markets. We develop a general
framework for modelling dynamic interaction based on recurrence relations,
and use this to show how unexpected latency and feedback can trigger os-
cillatory instability between HFT market makers with inventory constraints.
Our analysis suggests that the modelled instability is an unintentional emer-
gent behaviour of the market that does not depend on the complexity of HFT
strategies — even apparently stable strategies are vulnerable. Feedback in-
stability can lead to substantial movements in market prices such as price
spikes and crashes.
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1. Introduction
In a recent journal special issue on High Frequency Trading (HFT) Chor-
dia et al highlighted a key unanswered problem: what is “the nature of the
mechanism by which the interaction of HFT algorithms improves market
quality”? (Chordia et al., 2013). In the same issue, Hasbrouck and Saar
said they “cannot rule out that in times of severe market conditions HFTs
may contribute to market failure” (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013). Here, we
contribute to this debate by investigating the low-level mechanisms by which
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High Frequency Traders (HFTs) may interact to reduce market quality and
lead to failure, especially during times of market disequilibrium. We show
how coupling and feedback loops may occur between HFTs, we introduce a
general framework for modelling dynamic interaction between financial algo-
rithms, and we show how latency and feedback loops may trigger instability
as an unintentional emergent behaviour of the market.1
Concern has previously been expressed about the potential for feedback
loops to impact prices and destabilize markets (Danielsson et al., 2012; Zi-
grand et al., 2012). Feedback loops are not only widespread within the fi-
nancial markets but may also exist for a long time, in some cases possibly
remaining unnoticed. The adverse effects of a destabilising feedback loop
may only become apparent when its strength becomes sufficiently large.
A prominent example of market instability either arising from or exacer-
bated by HFTs was the Flash Crash of May 6th 2010 (CFTC-SEC, 2010).
Of direct relevance to our work is the “hot potato” trading behaviour of
market makers at the heart of the Flash Crash, where multiple HFTs traded
with each other in a rapid oscillation of large aggressive orders. This highly
unusual oscillatory instability created both deceptive trading volume (which
implied liquidity where none was present) and a spike in messaging traffic that
stressed the already-overloaded technology infrastructure (Nanex, 2010c).
We model dynamic coupling and feedback between HFTs at the level
of the market microstructure, and expose the underlying mechanics of dy-
namic interaction. We illustrate this with a case study of interaction between
inventory-driven HFT market makers (Menkveld, 2013) in an order-book
market, each executing a simple, stable trading strategy. Unlike those ob-
served by (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013), our HFTs do not intentionally interact
or “play” with each other. Nevertheless, we explain how dynamic coupling
between our HFTs leads to a feedback loop where each HFT influences the
behaviour of the other, and how this feedback has the potential to generate
unintentional instability (including highly volatile oscillatory behaviour) as
an emergent behaviour of the market.
Our model shows that one of the triggers for such behaviour is the in-
troduction of unexpected additional latency (unexpected delay), as might
be experienced for example when a sudden burst of quotes overwhelms an
1This follows a more pragmatic and sector-specific approach than our prior work on
modelling emergent behaviour such as Chen et al. (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).
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execution venue and causes market data feeds to be delayed. We illustrate
how we model and analyse a market where traders experience unexpected
delay and how this leads to instability.
The primary contribution of this article is to provide an alternative nar-
rative for market instability, using our dynamic interaction model to show
in great detail how latency and feedback loops between dynamically-coupled
HFTs may trigger unintentional market instability. Although our case study
focuses on oscillation arising from the interaction of automated market-
making strategies, we suspect that many of the previously observed feedback
loops (e.g. in Danielsson et al. (2012)) and the impact of market maker in-
ventories on time-varying liquidity (Comerton-Forde et al., 2010) may also be
modelled and analysed using the techniques we describe in this article. Our
work may also have implications for models of pricing and market impact,
since we demonstrate that traders do not necessarily have independence of
action and such models may need to account for unexpected coupling with
other traders.
The paper is organized as follows. First we set out the relationship with
prior work, followed by an introduction to modelling coupling and feedback.
Section 4 details our dynamic interaction model for a simple case study, and
Section 5 analyses this model and makes the link from coupling and feedback
to market instability (including numerical simulation results, which illustrate
some theoretically infinite modes of oscillation). Section 6 concludes, and is
followed by an appendix containing further definitions for our case-study.
2. Relation to prior work
Previous theoretical and empirical studies of instability have predomi-
nantly focused on interaction as an indirect process via prices (Arthur et al.,
1996; Caldarelli et al., 1997), or via globally-shared information (Brock and
Hommes, 1998; Lux and Marchesi, 1999; Hommes and Wagener, 2009) with-
out providing a detailed exploration of the underlying mechanism of interac-
tion that causes such price fluctuations. Where direct interaction is included
in the model, it is often abstracted — for example, using an Ising model to
provide an abstraction of nearest-neighbour communication between traders
(Kaizoji, 2000; Iori, 2002), or assuming traders form bidirectional links in a
random network (Cont and Bouchaud, 2000). By contrast, we explore the
mechanistic order-by-order interaction within the limit order book, where we
explicitly model multiple bilateral direct interactions between traders.
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We follow Iori (2002) and Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) by modelling dy-
namic interaction in discrete time, thereby exposing substantial microstruc-
ture detail such as the discrete nature of computer messaging, of order pro-
cessing by heterogeneous traders, and the discrete nature of order arrival and
order processing by the limit order book (Day and Huang, 1990).
We have found recurrence relations to be the most helpful technique for
our discrete-time models. Recurrence relations have been used in related
work such as price instability caused by fundamentalist/chartist interac-
tion (Chiarella et al., 2006), clustered volatility caused by feedback effects
(Farmer and Joshi, 2002), price instability from time-varying demand (Day
and Huang, 1990), and instability from leveraging (Thurner et al., 2012).
Game-theoretic models focus on the systemic instability effects of inter-
action between traders (Giardina and Bouchaud, 2003; Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2005), yet they start from the premise that instability arises from
the complexity of traders adapting the value of some internal parameter in
order to optimise a utility function, and the model is used to explore market
equilibria. By contrast, we are interested in systemic effects that arise from
traders with fixed strategies where no optimisation is involved and we explore
market disequilibria and detailed causation at a microstructure level.
Other studies of feedback in financial markets include: Gennotte and
Leland (1990), who model price instability and show how the extent of a
price crash may be determined by the feedback effect arising from unobserved
portfolio hedging; Bouchaud and Cont (1998), who emphasize the role of
feedback effects in market instability (in particular through risk aversion)
and utilise a Langevin equation to model feedback mediated via prices; and
Westerhoff (2003), whose agent-based numerical simulation explores risk-
averse market making strategies in foreign exchange markets and shows how
feedback interaction between market makers and speculators can increase
trading volume and distort exchange rates.
Menkveld and Zoican (2014) have recently provided a Markovian recursive
model of interaction between HFT market makers and predators; this is in the
same spirit as our model, in that it models direct interaction in discrete time
and aims to “uncover effects that remain hidden in static models” — however,
we develop a more general framework that for example supports a full order
book, dependencies on historical values, independent communication delays,
and the tracking of multiple variables at each time step.
Our work extends the current understanding of interaction-based instabil-
ity by examining the detailed mechanisms (including latency and feedback)
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by which HFTs (and others) can become dynamically coupled, causing them
to operate unintentionally as a collaborative unit that leads to nonlinear
oscillation and unstable markets. We suspect dynamic coupling may be im-
plicated in a range of previously observed instabilities.
3. Background to modelling feedback loops
For our purpose of modelling feedback loops, we consider a market to be
comprised of multiple subsystems, which may overlap. The smallest subsys-
tem is a single component; components can be any entity — for example, a
human trader or a trading algorithm or a news source, though components
may be larger (an exchange) or smaller (a risk management subroutine). A
subsystem may contain components or further subsystems. What is impor-
tant for the model is the interaction between these subsystems.
3.1. Coupling
We say that if the behaviour of one subsystem influences the behaviour
of another the latter is coupled to the former and the two comprise a larger
system that exhibits coupling. For example, two HFTs are coupled if one
mimics the operations of the other. The HFTs would also be coupled if one
of them acted according to some pattern triggered by the other’s activity.
Any two subsystems may be coupled and there may exist chains of coupled
subsystems (e.g. one HFT is coupled to another that in turn is coupled to
a news source). If a subsystem is coupled to itself either directly or indi-
rectly via a coupling chain, we define this to be a feedback loop and all the
subsystems in this cyclic chain are said to be mutually coupled.
We say a coupling is static if it always persists, with constant strength:
a coupling is dynamic if it is transient or has varying strength. Dynamic
coupling is less predictable, hence more dangerous, than static coupling. We
define market instability as a large change or volatility in one or more market
parameters such as market price, traded volume, or frequency of trading.
3.2. Oscillation, phases and phase-shifting
Oscillation can arise in many ways: for example, the interaction between
momentum and fundamental traders can lead to oscillatory price behaviour
(Sethi, 1996; Chiarella et al., 2006). Oscillatory instability may also arise
from two stabilising feedback loops. Consider a simple contrarian trader who
buys when prices are too low, and sells when prices are too high. Assume the
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prices of the trader’s limit orders are set to be halfway between the current
market price and a reference price (Tb for buying and Ts for selling); thus the
trader’s behaviour is coupled to the market price. If these orders affect the
market price, causing the price to drop when selling and to rise when buying,
then the market price is also coupled to the trader behaviour. A two-way
coupling is created and each phase (buying/selling) creates a stabilising feed-
back: when selling, market price asymptotically drops to Ts; when buying,
market price asymptotically rises to Tb. Now if Tb > Ts and if the strat-
egy exhibits inertia between Tb and Ts (if it was previously buying(selling),
it continues until Tb(Ts), at which point it switches to selling(buying)), the
combined effect is an oscillatory instability as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Oscillatory instability arising from two stabilising feedback loops: (a) the be-
haviours of the two trader feedback loops (the lines plot price during trader selling phase
and buying phase); (b) the three phases for the market as a whole — price bands identified
for rising (price < Ts), oscillating (Ts ≤ price ≤ Tb) and falling (price > Tb) prices.
Modelling such a market is complex because the behaviour of the market
in the region Tb > P > Ts is not entirely determined by the price P but also
by the current behavioural phase of the trading algorithm. The trader in this
example displays two behavioural phases : buying and selling. We also say
that the overall market exhibits three phases: a falling-price phase (P ≥ Tb),
a rising-price phase (P ≤ Ts), and an oscillating-price phase (Tb > P > Ts).
More precisely, we say that a phase of a subsystem (or of a market) is a
set of measurable properties which define a distinctly different behaviour of
the subsystem, and the transition from one phase to another we call phase-
shifting. Phase-shifting by itself is not necessarily a sign of instability, how-
ever we shall show later how phase-shifting can lead to instability.
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4. The Model
In this section we explain how we model dynamic coupling and feedback
in a financial market. We start with some background comments to explain
what we wish to model and why we adopt a particular approach; then we
illustrate our method with a case study. Our initial model is a market with
two market makers and an exchange; we then add a fundamental seller, and
additional unexpected communication latency (delay).
4.1. Background to the model
Our aim is to model coupling and feedback at a sufficient level of detail
to investigate how they arise, how they operate, and how they contribute to
market instability. Our technique is deterministic rather than probabilistic,
in order to expose precise mechanistic causality. For example, the precise
timing and interleaving of order flow may be critical to the analysis of insta-
bility arising from HFT interactions.
In general, when modelling a market with complex feedback loops, the
subsystem behaviours of interest may not be expressible in analytic form,
they may depend on local memory (e.g. whether to buy or sell at a price may
depend on whether the price has recently been rising or falling), they may
be rugged (non-smooth), and they may exhibit complex inter-relationships.
Here we present our deterministic discrete-time model using mutually-
recursive recurrence relations. A key characteristic of our model is that it
supports the direct expression of coupling in the structure of the model.
The recurrence relations describe how the value of a subsystem parameter
changes with time. Where one relation references another, this indicates a
dependency or coupling; where the latter also references the former, this in-
dicates a simple feedback loop. For example, consider the following relations
for parameters Xt, Yt and Zt (for general functions f(), g() and h()):
2
Xt = f(Y(t−1)) Yt = g(Z(t−1)) Zt = h(Y(t−1))
In the above equations, X is unidirectionally coupled to Y and there is a
bidirectional coupling between Y and Z. In a slightly less abstract example
of feedback, consider traders issuing sell orders based on a delta-hedging
model: the delta-hedging model depends on the price of a stock index; the
2The functions f(), g() and h() might express linear or nonlinear couplings.
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index depends on the prices of the component stocks; and the prices of stocks
depends on the price impact of sell orders arriving from the traders:
sellorderst = deltahedge(indext−1)
marketpricet = priceimpact(marketpricet−1, sellorderst−1)
indext = indeximpact(marketpricet−1)
It is sometimes more convenient to use a single function to define the be-
haviour of two or more parameters simultaneously. For example, parameters
Rt and St may be defined as the result of some general function f():
(Rt, St) = f(R(t−1), S(t−1))
Where the above style of description is used, the coupling is made explicit
inside the function f() (for example, Equation (4) in Section 4.2.1 uses a
function match() whose definition contains the detailed couplings).
We may also wish to explore the behaviour in time of a market parameter
X; this is achieved by animating the aforementioned equations from some
starting values (e.g. X0, Y0) and plotting the sequence {X0, X1, . . . Xfinal}.
This provides a time series such as that shown in Figure 1.
4.2. Case Study
To illustrate our technique, we provide as a case study the detailed model
of dynamic coupling with oscillatory feedback between risk-averse HFT mar-
ket makers. Although HFT market makers typically straddle multiple ex-
changes (Menkveld, 2013), our case study comprises a single exchange, with
a number maxi of market makers each identified by a number i; we then add
a fundamental seller. In our model the exchange manages two limit order
books — bidbookt for bids, and askbookt for asks.
Our method permits order flow to be modelled with each trader issuing
one order at each time step, or many orders. In our case study, each trader
issues up to four orders per time step (one bid, one ask, one sell and one
buy),3 and the exchange processes all orders received at one time step before
considering orders received at the next step.
3Bids and asks are resting (passive) orders. Buys and sells are aggressive executable
orders; e.g. immediately executable limit orders or market orders.
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4.2.1. Couplings
Figure 2 illustrates the couplings for a minimal system with an exchange
and two HFT market makers. Although this is a simplified version of real
market couplings, it is still complex. Many arrows in Figure 2 represent
dynamic couplings; e.g. a sell order is determined by the difference between
a trader’s inventory and its inventory threshold, and this varies with time.
Such feedback diagrams are not easy to analyse. We provide a formal, and
tractable, description by introducing a discrete time dimension. Each time
(t) represents the point when a message is sent from one entity to another,
and the step from t to t+ 1 represents the time taken for an entity to receive
incoming data, process it, and issue a new message. Many couplings occur
within a time-step but others are time-dependent where the behaviour of one
entity is coupled to the behaviour at a previous time of another entity (in
Figure 2 these are arrows with ovals at their tails). Our model requires that
every cyclic chain of couplings includes at least one time-dependent coupling.
In the model, all communication occurs synchronously — either all enti-
ties are processing, or they are all sending and receiving messages. Never-
theless, it is possible to model entities that take differing amounts of time to
calculate what to do next (e.g. a slow trader), and it is also possible to model
traders issuing orders at different times. Both of these effects are achieved by
supporting “empty” messages; for example, a fast trader might send orders
every even timestep and send an “empty” message every odd time step, and
a slow trader might send orders only on every tenth timestep (otherwise it
sends empty messages). Thus, we can specify the relative speeds of differ-
ent subsystems. Furthermore, we shall see in Section 4.3 how specific delay
components can be used to model different latencies in communications links.
For simplicity, we assume all traders and the exchange take the same time
to process incoming data and issue messages. Thus, the total round-trip time
between a trader and the exchange is two time steps, and if a trader waits
for a response to one order before issuing the next then that trader will only
issue orders on alternate time steps. We hereafter assume that traders issue
orders on even time steps and the exchange issues confirmations on odd steps.
The value of a parameter at time t may depend on its own previous value
at time t − 1 (or at any previous time, but it may not depend on its value
at the same time t). This is an example of a time-dependent coupling. For
example, we say that the inventory for trader i at time t + 1 (denoted by
invi,(t+1)) is coupled both to its value at the previous time step invi,t and to
9
the sizes of the confirmed executions (sent from the exchange at time t) of
that trader’s previously issued orders: xbidsi,t, xasksi,t, xbuysi,t and xsellsi,t.
Figure 2 denotes the dependency on the sizes of the executed orders as a
time-dependent feedback dependency (coloured black) because the inventory
depends on the sizes of the executions, which depend on previously issued
orders, which in turn depend on previous inventory.4
We introduce the selection function ψ(i, x) (see Appendix A) to sum the
sizes of all (and only) those orders issued by trader i in a set of orders x, and
our discrete-time recurrence relation for the inventory for market maker i is:
invi,(t+1) =
{
invi,t + ψ(i, xbidst) + ψ(i, xbuyst)
− ψ(i, xaskst)− ψ(i, xsellst) (1)
Equation (1) holds at all time steps, but inventory will only change on
even steps since the confirmations (xbids etc) are only issued on odd steps.
Similarly, we define the couplings (to current inventory invi,(t+1)) that
determine the size of each market maker’s sell and buy orders. We introduce
the functions buysize() and sellsize() (see Section 4.2.2), which embody
the market-maker internal logic for determining buy and sell sizes, and the
function order(), which takes an order type, size, price and identifier, and
returns an order. Orders are only issued on even time steps:5
buyi,(t+1) = order(buy, buysize(invi,(t+1)), ν, i)
selli,(t+1) = order(sell, sellsize(invi,(t+1)), ν, i)
We also introduce the functions bidsize() and asksize() (see Section 4.2.2)
to embody the sizing logic for resting limit order (coupled to inventory), and
the functions bidprice() and askprice() (see below) to embody the pricing
logic (coupled to both inventory and order-book information). This defines
how limit orders are coupled to trader inventory and order-book information
as illustrated in Figure 2, where the dependency on order-book information
is coloured black to denote a feedback dependency (e.g. because the best bid
price depends on the previously issued bids and the previously issued bids
4Although feedback couplings are generally time-dependent, time-dependent couplings
need not be feedback couplings.
5ν is the price of the executable order — for the rest of this paper, we assume executable
orders are market orders with no price (represented by ν=0).
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depended on the previous best bid price). Again, for even time steps only:
bidi,(t+1) = order( bid, bidsize(invi,(t+1)),
bidprice(bestbidt, bestaskt, invi,(t+1)), i)
aski,(t+1) = order( ask, asksize(invi,(t+1)),
askprice(bestbidt, bestaskt, invi,(t+1)), i)
Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) and
Menkveld (2013) show how market makers skew order prices to control their
inventories, and in our case study we use a very simple version of this be-
haviour: we set limit order prices such that for high inventory both bid and
ask prices are low (encouraging more asks and fewer bids to be executed)
and for low inventory both bid and ask prices are high (encouraging more
bids and fewer asks to be executed). We ensure that bid and ask prices are
not negative, new bid prices are not higher than midprice− 1, and new ask
prices are not lower than midprice+ 1 (so resting orders are never crossed).
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Figure 2: Coupling between components for a market with one exchange Exchange and
two HFT market makers Trader1 and Trader2. Arrows are unidirectional dependencies
(the head is coupled the tail): bold black arrows are key feedback dependencies (the dashed
arrows are explained in Section 4.2.1). If an arrow’s tail has an oval it is a time-related
dependency — the head is coupled to the value of the tail at a previous time. Traders
may issue sell or buy orders (determined only by current inventory inv) and may also
issue bid or ask orders (determined by inventory inv and knowledge of the best bid and
best ask at the exchange). Orders are grouped (e.g. Bids) before being added to the
intermediate bidbook′ and askbook′ and matched to produce sets of executed orders (e.g.
{xbidsi}, {xsellsi}) and the resulting bidbook and askbook. Each trader only sees his/her
own confirmed executions. Rectangles indicate functions that are described in the text.
In this simple model, crossed bids and asks are not executed against each other; neither
are buys against sells.
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Thus in our model the pricing functions have the simple form:6
bidprice(bestbid, bestask, inv) = max(0, (midprice− 1)− α× inv)
askprice(bestbid, bestask, inv) = max(0, (midprice+ 1) + β × inv) (2)
The orders from the two market makers are grouped before being pro-
cessed by the exchange and we represent these groups as ordered sequences
using the notation {. . .} (where {} is the empty sequence):
Bids(t+2) = {bid1,(t+1) . . . bidmaxi,(t+1)}
Asks(t+2) = {ask1,(t+1) . . . askmaxi,(t+1)}
Buys(t+2) = {buy1,(t+1) . . . buymaxi,(t+1)}
Sells(t+2) = {sell1,(t+1) . . . sellmaxi,(t+1)}
The exchange then processes the incoming orders.7 Bids and asks are
added to the bidbook and the askbook to create intermediate books bidbook′
and askbook′. In our model the order books are ordered sequences of limit
orders and the positions of the limit orders within an order book are deter-
mined by their price and their time of arrival.8 The first bid (ask) in bidbook′
(askbook′) is the one with the highest (lowest) price (and where there is more
than one bid (ask) at that price, they are sorted in order of arrival time so
that the earliest arriving bid (ask) is the first in the sequence). We introduce
the further notational device x : y to represent a sequence of orders where
the first order in the sequence is x and y is the remainder of the sequence
with x removed. It follows from the above that if bidbook = b : bs then the
best bid is b, and if askbook = a : as then the best ask is a.
To add new orders to an order book, we introduce the functions
insertbid() and insertask() (defined in Appendix A). If we wished bids
to rest on the bidbook until cancelled, we would define bidbook′ as:
bidbook′(t+2) = insertbid(bidbook(t+1),Bids (t+2))
However, to simplify the presentation of our case study, we assume that all
orders are Fill And Kill (they are fully or partially executed immediately or
6Detailed expressions for α and β are given in Appendix A but are not necessary to
understand this presentation.
7This simple model assumes all orders are guaranteed to be delivered to and accepted
by the exchange, though it is also possible to model order confirmations in the case of a
system where one or both of these assumptions does not hold.
8The coupling of bidbook and askbook to order arrival time is not shown in Figure 2.
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otherwise cancelled — also known as Immediate Or Cancel). We therefore
empty the order books before adding newly arrived orders:
bidbook′(t+2) = insertbid({},Bids(t+2))
askbook′(t+2) = insertask({},Asks(t+2))
(3)
The exchange then matches the incoming sell (or buy) orders issued at time
t + 1 with those limit orders resting on the bidbook′(t+2) (or askbook
′
(t+2)) to
determine the new trade executions xbids(t+2) and xsells(t+2) (or xasks(t+2)
and xbuys(t+2)) and the new bidbook(t+2) (or askbook(t+2)). The dependency
of bidbookt+2 (askbookt+2) on bidbookt+1 (askbookt+1) is another example of
a benign feedback and is coloured black in Figure 2.
The exchange’s matching engine is represented by the function match(),
which must also remove executed limit orders from the relevant order book
(discussed below). Confirmations are only issued on odd time steps:
(bidbookt+2, xbidst+2, xsellst+2) = match(bidbook
′
t+2, Sells(t+2))
(askbookt+2, xaskst+2, xbuyst+2) = match(askbook
′
t+2, Buys(t+2))
(4)
Each executed sell (buy) will be at the price of the currently best bid
(ask); and if the size of the sell (buy) is greater than that of the best bid
(ask), this may change the subsequent best bid (ask) price used for the next
execution. Thus, the executed sell (buy) prices are coupled to (i) the current
best bid (ask) prices, (ii) the sizes of the executed sell (buy) orders, and (iii)
the sizes of the bids (asks) in bidbook′ (askbook′).
The operation of the matching engine is complex (see Appendix A), but
we can express the executed sell prices and buy prices inductively using the
function P (r : rr, e : ee) where e : ee is a sequence of executable orders to be
matched against an ordered sequence r : rr of resting limit orders (using the
notation introduced above). We consider one executable order at a time; we
match each executable order against the resting limit orders on the relevant
order book — if there is no liquidity, there are no more trades, but otherwise
we have (where pi() gives the price of an order, σ() gives the size of an order,
and ρ(x, y) reduces the size of x by the size of y):
P (r : rr, e : ee) =

pi(r) : P (ρ(r, e) : rr, ee) if (σ(e) < σ(r))
pi(r) : P (rr, ρ(e, r) : ee) if (σ(e) > σ(r))
pi(r) : P (rr, ee) if (σ(e) = σ(r))
(5)
The above equation for market prices specifies exactly how the matching
engine “walks the book” in order to fill an executable order — first executing
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against the best-priced resting limit order and, if that was insufficient to
fill the executable order, progressing to the next-best resting order. Given
a particular distribution of limit orders on the book, a large total size of
executable orders is more likely (than a small total size) to deplete the top
price level on the relevant order book and cause a jump in the execution price
(see Figure 3). Whether a price change will occur at all is simply given by
comparing the total sizes of all executable orders (in either Sell or Buy) with
the total sizes of all the resting limit orders resting on the relevant book at
the best price (if the former is greater, then at least one execution will be at
a different price). How much the price moves will depend on the distribution
of limit orders on the book — especially the distribution near the top of the
book, and the degree of “gapping” in that distribution.
Size	  of	  	  
bids	  
Size	  of	  	  
asks	  
Price	  a	  b	  c	  
Figure 3: Matching sells against bids: the executed prices occur first at the best bid (a);
then at (b) since this will have become the new best bid; and finally a larger price jump
to (c). The bolded portions of the bid lines are the executions.
The information from bidbookt and askbookt is published by the exchange,
including the best bid and ask prices which are used by the traders in cal-
culating the next set of limit orders. The values xbidst, xaskst, xbuyst and
xsellst are the local trade confirmations sent by the exchange to the relevant
traders (the two counterparties to the trade). Finally, Figure 2 contains two
bold dashed black arrows which merge with two other feedback arrows —
this represents an optional price banding constraint that might be applied as
a market protection mechanism.9
This completes our set of recurrence relations to model the main depen-
dencies illustrated in Figure 2. We note in particular that the existence of
9For a practical example of price banding, see
http://www.cmegroup.com/confluence/display/EPICSANDBOX/GCC+Price+Banding
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identified feedback dependencies makes it possible to trace many feedback
loops — including feedback loops that involve both market makers, as can
be seen from the feedback loops crossing the horizontal midline in Figure 2.
4.2.2. Phase shifting
The previous section described how we model dependencies between sys-
tem components, but we have not yet described the detailed behaviour of the
market-making algorithm. In particular, we wish to model the phase-shifting
of an algorithm between two different types of behaviour. Computer trading
algorithms are frequently subject to phase-shifting, typically implemented as
conditional branches to choose between different behaviours in different mar-
ket contexts. Here we create an algorithm with a somewhat simplistic shift
between two dramatically different behaviours — in practice, an algorithm
might exhibit many phases and the switching between phases might be more
subtle than this example.
We model a simple risk-averse, long-short market maker that actively
manages risk based on the size of the current inventory (Manaster and Mann,
1996). Although in practice a market maker could make complex risk cal-
culations, it suffices for our model simply to use raw inventory (since we
are only interested in the switching between behaviours and not precise val-
ues). Our market maker uses a threshold policy (Huang et al., 2012) with an
upper-bound inventory limit UL and a lower-bound inventory limit LL (a
negative number). To simplify the presentation, these limits are assumed to
be fixed, though in practice they could vary according to market risk factors
such as observed volatility. Based on these inventory limits, our risk-averse
market maker phase-shifts between two different behaviours:
1. A stable phase whenever LL < invi,t < UL, where only resting limit
orders are issued — at each even time step (to allow for round-trip
communication with the exchange) both a bid and an ask are issued.
We assume that all orders are Fill And Kill.10 A special situation arises
for invi,t = LL+1 where only a bid is issued and invi,t = UL−1 where
only an ask is issued.
2. A panic phase whenever invi,t ≥ UL or invi,t ≤ LL, where at each even
time step either a large sell or a large buy is issued in an attempt to
10See (Chakraborty and Kearns, 2011) for a similar model, though in our simple case
study we only place one bid and one ask at each time step.
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revert inventory to zero.11 In our model, executable order size is either
UL for a positive-inventory panic or−LL for a negative-inventory panic
— in practice, the size might also depend on market conditions and
constraints, but we find this simple approximation is sufficient for our
initial model. No resting limit orders are issued in a panic phase.
Phase-switching is defined in the functions that determine order size:
buysize(invi,t) =
{
0 if (invi,t > LL)
−LL otherwise
sellsize(invi,t) =
{
0 if (invi,t < UL)
UL otherwise
bidsize(invi,t) =
{
0 if (invi,t ≥ UL)
bidsize′(invi,t) otherwise
asksize(invi,t) =
{
0 if (invi,t ≤ LL)
asksize′(invi,t) otherwise
Precise limit order size is delegated to the functions bidsize′() and asksize′().
Our model does not require any particular values to be chosen, but we observe
that if the limit order sizes are chosen to be within the shaded region of
Figure 4 then under normal circumstances the market maker will not switch
into a panic phase if it starts in the stable phase (see Section 5.2). For
our case study, we set bid and ask sizes to be exactly the maximum that
will never exceed the inventory limits UL and LL (to keep the presentation
simple, we ignore details such as minimum size constraints imposed by the
exchange, and we use a single large order rather than splitting into several
smaller orders). Thus:
bidsize′(inv) = max(0, UL− 1− inv)
asksize′(inv) = max(0, inv − (LL+ 1)) (6)
11This aligns (somewhat simplistically) with the empirical observation of (Kirilenko
et al., 2010) that “HFTs do not accumulate a significant net position and their position
tends to quickly revert to a mean of about zero”, and with the Nanex description of HFT
behaviour during the Flash Crash: “they slammed the market with 2,000 or more contracts
as fast as they could” (Nanex, 2010b).
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Figure 4: Risk-averse order sizes as a function of inventory, given inventory limits LL and
UL. Bidsize crosses the y axis at UL− 1 and asksize crosses the y axis at −(LL+ 1). If
bid (ask) size is chosen within the shaded area beneath the “bidsize” (“asksize”) line, then
it is impossible under normal conditions for inventory to reach the limit (see Section 5.2).
4.2.3. Adding a fundamental seller
In the next section we will require a fundamental seller to provide sell
orders to trade with the market makers. We therefore define the equations
for a trader with index 0 whose behaviour is to issue a sell order of a fixed
size ω at every even time step (it does nothing else) up to a predetermined
time timelimit, and then exits the market. Thus (for even time steps only):
buy0,t = order(buy, 0, 0, 0)
sell0,t =
{
order(sell, ω, 0, 0) if (t < timelimit)
order(sell, 0, 0, 0) otherwise
bid0,t = order(bid, 0, 0, 0)
ask0,t = order(ask, 0, 0, 0)
4.3. Modelling information delay
Information delay is a known and widespread source of instability in the
financial markets (Beja and Goldman, 1980; Chiarella, 1992; CFTC-SEC,
2010; Tse et al., 2012). We define information delay to be an unexpected
additional latency in transmitting information; it may manifest in different
ways throughout a financial market, and may affect all kinds of information.
For example: (i) delays in financial and economic news, and consequent
delays in relevant information being incorporated into traded prices (Beja
and Goldman, 1980; Chiarella, 1992); (ii) delays due to exchange throttling;
(iii) delays due to technology infrastructure having switched to a business-
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continuity site; (iv) delays in market data: both direct feeds (Nanex, 2010c;
Informa, 2011; Levin, 2012; Eholzer, 2013) and consolidated feeds (CFTC-
SEC, 2010; Nanex, 2010c); (v) delays and dropouts in the transmission of any
information due to lost or corrupted messages (Corvil, 2009); and (vi) delays
in any messages to or from an execution venue due to excessive message traffic
exceeding the capacities of inbound and/or outbound queues; typically when
the market is under stress, but also potentially due to deliberate “quote-
stuffing” manipulation by traders (Tse et al., 2012).12
The extent of delays can be considerable. For example, order processing
times at Eurex are normally 0.2ms–0.35ms but can be delayed by a factor
of 10 under normal business conditions and occasionally by a factor of 200
(Eholzer, 2013); and market data reporting from NYSE to the CQS system
during the Flash Crash was delayed by 5, 000ms – 24, 000ms (Nanex, 2010c).
Delayed information can substantially affect trading algorithms, since
they will make calculations based on incorrect data. For example, a risk-
averse market maker operating a two-phase strategy as described above may
under-estimate inventory risk and this may lead to a phase-shift from “nor-
mal” to “panic” trading. Where all traders are affected by delays then sys-
temic effects such as oscillatory instability may ensue.
Consider the introduction of a delay in the trade-confirmation communi-
cations link from the exchange to the traders, and let the confirmations of
all executed orders be delayed by an additional δ time steps where δ ∈ N.
We model the delayed information on executed orders as four separate com-
ponents defined as follows:
(dxbidst, dxaskst) = (xbids(t−δ), xasks(t−δ))
(dxbuyst, dxsellst) = (xbuys(t−δ), xsells(t−δ))
This delay is inserted into our model by specifying that the market maker
uses the delayed versions rather than the undelayed versions of the executed
orders. Equation (1) becomes:
invi,(t+1) = invi,t + ψ(i, dxbidst) + ψ(i, dxbuyst)
− ψ(i, dxaskst)− ψ(i, dxsellst)
12Even specialist high-bandwidth interfaces (Eholzer, 2013) may suffer from delays when
traffic is excessive. Furthermore, if an exchange provides information about current delays
(Eholzer, 2013) in a normal message, this information will itself be delayed.
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The advantages of modelling delays as components are that: (i) delays
are made both explicit and precise; (ii) the extent of individual delays may
easily be modified with a simple localised change in the model; and (iii)
different delays may be inserted at many different points in the market being
modelled — for example, if confirmations of sells were delayed twice as much
as other orders, we could write dxsellst = xsells(t−2δ).
4.4. Summary of modelling with recurrence relations
The foregoing equations define our model of the main components of our
case study: the exchange, the market makers, and a fundamental seller. We
claim that this style of definition, using mutually-recursive recurrence rela-
tions, has the advantage that the multiple interactions between the compo-
nents are made explicit. For example: (i) market maker prices bidprice and
askprice are coupled to the best bid and best ask prices published by the
exchange (Equation (2)); (ii) market maker inventories are coupled to the
executed orders xbids, xask, xbuys and xsells published by the exchange
(Equation (1)); and (iii) the executed orders at the exchange are coupled to
the orders received from the traders (Equation (4)).
This equational style provides a highly expressive medium for the descrip-
tion of coupling effects in financial systems with complex dependencies, and
we find it to be very useful during the formulation and discussion of hypothe-
ses. It can be used at varying levels of abstraction (it is not necessary for
all components to be modelled at the same level of detail) and it supports a
wide variety of real behaviours, including information delay.
5. From Coupling to Instability
Here we use our case study to illustrate how we reason about coupling-
induced instability in a financial market. First we review the feedback loops
in Figure 2, and indicate how instability in trader inventories may lead to
instability in market prices. We show that under normal circumstances our
market makers are stable, and then we show how instability can be induced
by the introduction of an information delay. The remainder of the section
shows how we analyse feedback effects and market instability.
For a different case study, e.g. with different pricing functions and strate-
gies, the dynamic interaction model would be different but our reasoning
process in relation to coupling, feedback and instability would be the same.
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5.1. Feedback loops
Figure 2 gives the bilateral couplings for our case study with one exchange
and two market makers, showing how selected components are coupled. The
bilateral couplings form chains, and the bolded arrows in the figure show key
couplings that turn chains into feedback loops.
Limit order prices are coupled to the best bid and ask prices, which are
coupled to the prices of previously-issued limit orders. This forms a feedback
loop; either a trader is coupled to him/herself, or a loop covers both traders.
The two bold dashed arrows show the effect of an optional price-banding
constraint where order prices are deliberately coupled to the last traded price,
thereby creating a feedback loop.
Inventories are coupled to the sizes of trades, and the sizes of trades are
coupled to the order sizes, which themselves are coupled to the previous
inventories. This creates a dynamic feedback loop (Figure 2) comprising
chains of dynamic couplings. We will later show how this feedback loop can
induce inventory oscillation.
Market price is an attribute of the executed trades — it is not (absent
price-banding) a component of a feedback loop,13 though it is coupled to the
above feedback loop that connects executed trades to inventories. As the
traders’ inventories change, so the limit order book is exposed to changing
pressure on traded prices. The bid book comes under price pressure as the
total sizes of all sell orders exceeds the total sizes of all bids at the best price,
and the ask book comes under pressure as the total sizes of all buys exceeds
the total sizes of all asks at the best price. Unbalanced pressure causes the
market price to move: balanced pressure leads to liquidity being depleted at
the top of both books, more volatile traded prices and increasing spreads.
Figure 5 illustrates the couplings by which unstable inventories might
destabilize market price. The feedback loop between inventories and order
sizes can be explored in further detail by expanding Equation (1). The size
of each execution is the minimum of the resting order size and the executable
order size; at each time step the latter is always either UL for the first sell
or −LL for the first buy, and the former is given by Equation (6):
13In the presence of price-banding, order prices would be coupled to market price, form-
ing another feedback loop.
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Figure 5: How unstable inventories can affect market price. Order prices and sizes are
coupled to inventories, traded prices and sizes are (via the matching function) coupled to
order prices and sizes, and inventories are coupled to traded sizes.
invi,(t+1) = invi,t +ψ(i, xbidst) + ψ(i, xbuyst)
−ψ(i, xaskst)− ψ(i, xsellst)
= invi,t +min(UL, bidsizei,(t−1)) +min(−LL, asksizej,(t−1))
−min(−LL, asksizei,(t−1))−min(UL, bidsizej,(t−1))
= invi,t +min(UL,max(0, UL− 1− invi,(t−1)))
+min(−LL,max(0, invj,(t−1) − (LL+ 1)))
−min(−LL,max(0, invi,(t−1) − (LL+ 1)))
−min(UL,max(0, UL− 1− invj,(t−1)))
The recurrence relation for inventory displays complex feedback: invi,(t+1)
is not only coupled to its previous values at times t and t-1 but also to the
other trader’s inventory at time t-1 (invj,(t−1)). Furthermore, this recurrence
relation only holds if trades occur between the two traders — yet, if both start
in a stable phase there should be no executable orders and no trades. We shall
devote the remainder of this section to the analysis of the dynamic behaviour
of our simple market-making strategy: first, to establish its inherent stability,
then to demonstrate how it may be destablized, and finally to explore how
two or more such market makers may exhibit self-exciting instability.
5.2. Stability of a single market maker
Here we analyse the dynamic behaviour of a single market maker’s inven-
tory. We establish that under normal conditions if our market maker starts
in a stable phase it cannot shift into a panic phase.
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A simple algebraic manipulation can be used to establish the stability of
the market. From Section 4.2.2, we know that if LL + 1 ≤ invi,0 ≤ UL − 1
then our market maker issues only resting limit orders. Consider the extreme
case for the maximum achievable inventory — i.e. when at every time step
all bids and no asks for the market maker are executed. Furthermore, recall
the prerequisites for our case study — that all limit orders are Fill And Kill
(so there are no resting bids from before time t-1), and that traders issue
orders only on even time steps (so invi,(t−1) = invi,(t−2) if t is even). Now
Equation (1) may be explored by expanding terms as follows:
invi,t = invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, xbids(t-1)) + ψ(i, xbuys(t-1))
− ψ(i, xasks(t-1))− ψ(i, xsells(t-1))
= invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, xbids(t-1))− ψ(i, xasks(t-1)) ∵ only limit orders
= invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, xbids(t-1)) ∵ only bids executed
= invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, bidbook
′
(t-1)) ∵ all bids executed
= invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, Bids(t-1)) ∵ no old bids, Eq.3
= invi,(t-1) + bidsizei,(t-2)
= invi,(t-1) + max(0, UL− 1− invi,(t-2))
= invi,(t-1) + max(0, UL− 1− invi,(t-1)) if t is even
= max(invi,(t-1), UL− 1)
Thus (UL − 1) is a strict, inclusive, upper-bound for the market maker
inventory. By a similar argument, (LL+1) is a strict, inclusive, lower-bound.
We therefore say this market-making algorithm is stable — it will never reach
either of its two inventory limits UL or LL, and therefore will never panic
and will never issue aggressive executable orders.
5.3. Instability induced by information delay
If a delay were introduced into the market, unknown to the market maker,
such that confirmations of all trades were delayed by δ time steps, and if
there were another trader issuing sells to hit the bids, then we would use the
following revised inventory equation, from which (by expanding terms, with
the same assumptions as above) we derive a prerequisite for a market maker
to shift into panic in such a market.
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invi,t = invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, dxbids(t-1)) + ψ(i, dxbuys(t-1))
− ψ(i, dxasks(t-1))− ψ(i, dxsells(t-1))
= invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, dxbids(t-1))
= invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, xbids(t-1-δ))
= invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, bidbook
′
(t-1-δ)) ∵ all bids executed
= invi,(t-1) + ψ(i, Bids(t-1-δ)) ∵ no old bids, Eq.3
= invi,(t-1) + bidsizei,(t-2-δ)
= invi,(t-1) + max(0, UL− 1− invi,(t-2-δ))
= max(invi,(t-1), UL− 1 + invi,(t-1) − invi,(t-2-δ))
The trader will phase-shift into panic if invt ≥ UL and from the above
we therefore have the worst-case pre-condition for shifting to panic that:14
invi,(t−1) > invi,(t−2−δ)
5.3.1. Analysing delay (behaviour of shift into panic)
Consider the case where a market maker’s inventory has been stable at
value ν for some time,15 and then at time τ a fundamental buyer enters the
market and issues very large sell orders at every time step — sufficient to
cause every bid to be executed. Assume δ = 2. The previously used algebraic
manipulation can be applied, and the changes in inventory for the market
maker (which only occur on even timesteps) would be:
Time Inventory Reason
τ ν xbids(τ−3) = {}
τ + 2 ν xbids(τ−1) = {}
τ + 4 max(ν, (UL− 1) + ν − ν) = UL− 1 xbids(τ+1) 6= {}
τ + 6 max(UL− 1, (UL− 1) + (UL− 1)− ν) > UL− 1 ν < UL− 1
Thus, the market maker’s inventory hits or exceeds the limit UL at time
step τ + 6, at which point the market maker shifts into a panic phase and
issues executable orders to offload the excess inventory.
14Since traders issue orders only on even time steps, this is equivalent to invi,(t−2) >
invi,(t−2−δ) if t is even.
15Here, ν can take any value ν < (UL − 1) — in Section 5.4.1 we shall return to this
example with ν = 2− UL
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More generally, Figure 6 illustrates how the introduction of a delay af-
fects inventory: without a delay, the inventory asymptotically approaches the
limit UL (at a rate that depends on the sizes of its executed bids); whereas
if a delay is introduced the inventory initially is unchanged because trade
confirmations are buffered in the delay component and the market maker
issues more orders based on this unchanged inventory, then the first delayed
trade confirmation is received and the inventory increases. The subsequent
increase in inventory is linear for the same length of time as the inventory
was previously unchanged (because in our case study the bid sizes and conse-
quently the executions are directly linked to current inventory), and then the
inventory increases at a slower rate because the confirmed trades result now
from bids issued at higher inventories. The inventory then hits or exceeds
the limit UL and the market maker shifts into the panic phase.
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Figure 6: Inventory grows with and without delay
5.3.2. Analysing delay (shift back into stable phase)
In the panic phase the market maker will try to return to a stable phase as
soon as possible by issuing a sell order. Whether this is possible in one trans-
action depends on both the extent to which the current inventory exceeds
the limit and whether the resting liquidity on the order book is sufficient to
fully execute the sell order. To provide such liquidity, thereby permitting
the market maker to phase-shift back to a stable phase, we would require
the other trader to phase-shift its own behaviour so that it issues bids. In
the best case for our case study, ψ(i, xsells(t−1−δ)) = UL (i.e. the market
maker’s sell is completely executed) and we have:
invi,t = invi,(t−1) − ψ(i, dxsells(t−1))
= invi,(t−1) − ψ(i, xsells(t−1−δ))
= invi,(t−1) − UL
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If the inventory is too high (invi,(t−1) ≥ 2UL) or the available liquidity is
too small (ψ(i, xsells(t−1−δ)) ≤ invi,(t−1)−UL), the market maker will stay in
panic and will keep issuing sell orders until (if satisfied) the current inventory
falls below the UL limit.
With the introduction of a very small delay into the market, an oscilla-
tory phase-shifting of another trader can, via unidirectional coupling (with
no feedback), induce an oscillatory phase-shifting behaviour in the market
maker. Our equational model illustrates very clearly how this occurs: if the
other trader phase-shifts between issuing sells and bids, this leads to a mar-
ket maker oscillation between a positive-inventory panic phase and a stable
phase as shown above, and by contrast if the other trader phase-shifts be-
tween issuing buys and asks, this leads to a market maker oscillation between
a negative-inventory panic phase and a stable phase.
5.4. Self-exciting feedback with two market makers
Here we analyse a market containing a feedback loop, where two mar-
ket makers can be induced into a self-exciting oscillation. To establish the
feedback loop requires a third trader (a fundamental seller to hit the bids),
together with a destabilising scenario such as information delay to send one
of the market makers into a panic phase. As soon as one of the market mak-
ers shifts into panic (it doesn’t matter which one, but we assume that they
do not both panic at the same time), the third trader is no longer needed
and exits the market. Having achieved a situation where one market maker
is in panic and the other is stable, they are able to trade with each other;
one issues an executable order and the other issues resting limit orders.
The market maker in panic will reduce its inventory by trading with
the stable market maker, and this will change the inventories of both; since
the orders subsequently issued by both are dependent on their inventories,
there exists a bi-directional coupling between the two market makers. This
creates a feedback loop (involving the two market makers, the exchange and
the delay component), and we shall demonstrate how this feedback loop is
“self-exciting” in that it needs no other component to continue.
This feedback loop can lead to an infinite oscillatory instability between
the two market makers, with each shifting in and out of panic in a syn-
chronised contra-oscillation. At first such carefully choreographed contra-
oscillation may appear to be unlikely, but our flow analysis will show how the
synchronicity arises naturally out of the equations that describe the market,
with the action of one component causing the action of the other component.
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5.4.1. Information delay with two market makers
We recreate the delay market described in Section 5.3, but now with two
market makers and a fundamental trader, and with a delay δ in all trade
confirmations. As before, it is a precondition that the fundamental trader
leaves the market as soon as one market maker is in panic and the other is
stable (if both market makers panic at exactly the same time step, there will
be no trades — the market will remain inactive and therefore stable).
We assume the additional delay δ from the exchange is unknown to the
traders and they are unaware that their current inventories may subsequently
be increased or decreased as the result of trade executions that have oc-
curred but whose confirmations have not yet been received. Consequently,
a stable market maker may issue a limit order that, if executed, may cause
the previously-panicking market maker to become stable and the previously-
stable market maker to enter a panic phase.
Our model facilitates analysis and understanding of the behaviour of this
market, since it permits the tracking of individual items of the market state
(such as orders and confirmations) at each time step. Table 1 illustrates such
detailed flows — this flow analysis demonstrates how a starting market state
at time τ where market maker 2 is in positive panic (inventory 2UL−2) and
the other is stable (inventory 2 − UL) can without external impetus move
first to a market state where both traders are stable (time τ + 4), then to a
state where market maker 2 is stable and market maker 1 is in panic (time
τ + 6), and finally back again to both being stable (time τ + 10).
In this example, the delayed transit of one trade confirmation is high-
lighted by a succession of three grey cells.16 Different patterns of movement
in and out of panic are generated with different starting inventories, except
that there is a precondition that the initial stable inventory is not UL − 1,
since this would result in no bids being issued and therefore no trade (the
market would be static and stable).
16In general, we need δ − 1 pending xorders columns for this kind of flow analysis.
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time inv1 inv2 orders xorders pending dxorders inv1 inv2
(t) (t) (size) xorders (t+ 1) (t+ 1)
τ 2-UL 2UL-2 θb,1,τ
(2UL-3)
θS,2,τ
(UL)
2-UL 2UL-2
τ+1 2-UL 2UL-2 (θb,1,τ ,
θS,2,τ )UL
2-UL 2UL-2
τ+2 2-UL 2UL-2 θb,1,τ+2
(2UL-3)
θS,2,τ+2
(UL)
(θb,1,τ ,
θS,2,τ )
UL
2-UL 2UL-2
τ+3 2-UL 2UL-2 (θb,1,τ+2,
θS,2,τ+2)
UL
(θb,1,τ ,
θS,2,τ )
UL
2 UL-2
τ+4 2 UL-2 θb,1,τ+4
(UL-3)
θb,2,τ+4
(1)
(θb,1,τ+2,
θS,2,τ+2)
UL
2 UL-2
τ+5 2 UL-2 (θb,1,τ+2,
θS,2,τ+2)
UL
UL+2 -2
τ+6 UL+2 -2 θS,1,τ+6
(UL),
θb,2,τ+6
(UL+1)
UL+2 -2
τ+7 UL+2 -2 (θS,1,τ+6,
θb,2,τ+6)
UL
UL+2 -2
τ+8 UL+2 -2 θS,1,τ+8
(UL),
θb,2,τ+8
(UL+1)
(θS,1,τ+6,
θb,2,τ+6)
UL
UL+2 -2
τ+9 UL+2 -2 (θS,1,τ+8,
θb,2,τ+8)
UL
(θS,1,τ+6,
θb,2,τ+6)
UL
2 UL-2
τ+10 2 UL-2 θb,1,τ+10
(UL-3)
θb,2,τ+10
(1)
(θS,1,τ+8,
θb,2,τ+8)
UL
2 UL-2
τ+11 2 UL-2 (θS,1,τ+8,
θb,2,τ+8)
UL
2-UL 2UL-2
τ+12 2-UL 2UL-2 θb,1,τ+12
(2UL-3)
θS,2,τ+12
(UL)
2-UL 2UL-2
Table 1: Inventory and flow analysis for two panicking HFT market makers: delay δ = 2;
time τ is even; HFTs orders are issued on even timesteps and executed on odd timesteps.
Negative panics (and executable buy orders) never occur, so asks are not shown. Columns
4 to 7 give: orders issued (orders); trades executed (xorders); trade confirmations sent
but not yet received (pending xorders); and confirmations received (dxorders). Orders
are denoted by θb (bid) and θS (sell), followed by the size; panic inventories are bolded.
One confirmation flow is highlighted in grey. The rows at times τ and τ+12 are identical
and after time τ+12 the market infinitely repeats the flows and inventories from times
τ+1 to τ+12, with both HFTs oscillating in and out of panic.
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5.5. Infinite oscillation
The alternate phase-shifting illustrated in Table 1 is due to the bidirec-
tional coupling between the two market makers, and this can lead to an
infinite oscillation where two market makers trade with each other indefi-
nitely. This is highly unusual for market makers, who make a loss on each
filled executable order17 — this behaviour is not motivated by any economic
imperative but is an artefact of the unintentional dynamic coupling between
the two automated strategies. Our analysis demonstrates that an infinite
oscillation is theoretically possible by detecting the case where the market
state repeats itself — in particular, the repetition of a sub-state consisting
of the two inventories and the outstanding trades whose confirmations have
not yet been delivered. This is illustrated in Table 1 at times τ and τ + 12.
The inventory and flow analysis in Table 1 provides a detailed understanding
of how such oscillations may occur, and we have found flow analysis espe-
cially helpful in understanding markets with delays. The resulting changes in
inventory for the two market makers is further illustrated in Figure 7 (Left).
Manual algebraic manipulation is appropriate for markets involving rel-
atively few instances of coupling, and flow analysis helps to explore market
behaviour in great detail over a short timescale. Although it is possible to au-
tomate algebraic manipulation using a symbolic algebra application, we have
found numerical simulation to be more helpful for modelling and analysing
the behaviour of complex feedback markets over longer timescales; we view
numerical simulation as an important component of hypothesis formulation,
to assist in clarifying hypotheses and the consequences that ensue from the
logic embodied in a given hypothesis given certain initial conditions.
We have built a numerical simulator (“InterDyne”18) that visualizes our
model by animating all its underlying equations through time (as mentioned
in Section 4.1). This allows us to monitor time-varying interactions between
different components. Our simulator also allows us to expand our recurrence
relations to be substantially more complex and to encompass a much greater
range of real behaviour, such as randomised order arrival times at the ex-
change, the execution of crossed bids and asks, and markets with a large
number of heterogeneous market makers using different order pricing and
17In a flat market, they gain the spread on executions of pairs of bid and ask limit
orders, but lose the spread on an executable order.
18InterDyne was originally coded in the functional language Miranda (Turner (1985),
Clack (1995)).
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sizing functions, with different inventory thresholds. We are therefore able
to explore the effect on market instability of different order arrival times,
and we are able to demonstrate that the emergent market instability is not
dependent on a particular choice of market-making strategy (e.g. it is not
simply due to resonance between several identical algorithms).
5.5.1. The phase-shift into panic
A necessary precondition for oscillatory instability is that at least one
market maker should be in a panic state. We have previously demonstrated
how a fundamental trader can provoke a market maker into a panic state if
there is an information delay, and Figure 7 (Right) shows this in simulation
for four heterogeneous market makers with randomised order arrival times,
leading to a phase-shifting oscillation.
In this example, the four market makers have different inventory limits
and different order pricing and sizing functions. For example, resting order
sizes are chosen randomly in a range bounded by 0 and a maximum given
by Equation (6). They are all initially in a stable state within the inventory
limits. However, a fundamental seller (not shown in the figure) who issues
a fixed number of executable orders in the first few timesteps can lead one
market maker to panic, and then the other market makers.
Trader	  1	   Trader	  2	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  In
ve
nt
or
y	  
*me	  
UL	  
LL	  
PANIC	  
In
ve
nt
or
y 
Time 
2UL 
  UL 
    0 
   LL 
 2LL 
0                                                               100 
Figure 7: Left: oscillatory instability with two homogeneous traders moving in and out of
panic in contra-correlation. Right: oscillating inventories of four coupled heterogeneous
traders in a delayed market — inventories are initially stable, but the market makers are
provoked into panic by a single fundamental seller (not shown) issuing sells at the start of
the simulation; this seller stops once panic has been provoked. In both figures the shaded
zone indicates the stable region of the trader with the smallest inventory limit.
5.5.2. Infinite paired coupling
Figure 8 shows the dynamic inventories of five homogeneous market mak-
ers when a market exhibits a minimal information delay of one time step, and
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when order arrival times at the exchange are randomised at each time step.
For this example, two of the traders start trading from a positive-inventory
panic state, another two traders start from a negative-inventory panic state,
and the last trader starts with an inventory of zero.
In
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y 
Time 0 100 
   UL 
     0 
   LL 
Figure 8: Inventory changes for paired coupling in a market with five homogeneous market
makers. The shaded zone is a stable state zone within the algorithms’ inventory limits.
Figure 8 shows the simulation for the first 100 time steps. In roughly
the first 25 steps all market makers trade among themselves causing periodic
jumps to the panic state and back (due to information delay). These jumps
are undesired because the executable orders typically incur financial loss;
the market makers therefore try to avoid those jumps by restraining their
resting orders when their inventories approach the limits UL and LL. In the
remaining 75 steps three out of five market makers manage to stabilize their
inventories near the limit UL. At an inventory of exactly UL − 1 they do
not issue any bids, and if there are no delayed executions in the pipeline they
cannot phase-shift into a positive-inventory panic. However, the other two
market makers remain coupled in a feedback loop and continue to trade with
each other (similar to Figure 7 (Left)). This leads to an infinite oscillation,
where the two market makers repeatedly exchange the same inventory. This
could create a continuously false impression of market liquidity.
5.6. How inventory oscillations affect market price
Figure 5 shows how market prices are coupled to the previously described
inventory feedback loop, and we have demonstrated how even a very small
information delay can trigger that feedback loop to create an oscillating insta-
bility in the market maker inventories. What we have not yet demonstrated
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is the extent to which inventory instability can affect market price — i.e. the
strength of the coupling relationship between inventories and prices.
In Section 4.2.1 we presented Equation (5) to specify how the matching
engine “walks the book” in order to fill an executable order, and Figure 3
illustrated how, given a particular distribution of limit orders on the book,
a large total size of executable orders is more likely (than a small size) to
deplete the top price level on the book and cause a jump in execution price.
The effects on market price are subtle; different distributions of starting
inventories lead to different distributions of orders on bidbook and askbook
and therefore different probabilities that a particular executable order will
cause a price jump. However, in our simple case study we found that a
coarse measure of the pressure from large executable orders overwhelming
the liquidity on the book can be used as a good “rough guide” to changes in
price — it causes prices to change within a single time step, and changes the
basic parameters (e.g. best bid and best ask) that drive the pricing functions.
Our coarse measure (for which we make no general claims) subtracts
the pressure on resting bids from the pressure on resting asks, and we call
this “Net Liquidity Pressure”; if its value is mostly positive we predict rising
prices, and if it is mostly negative we predict falling prices.19 In our case study
all orders are Fill And Kill, and this simplifies the definitions enormously:20
Net Liquidity Pressuret =
∑
i ψ(i, Buyst)
1 +
∑
i ψ(i, Askst)
−
∑
i ψ(i, Sellst)
1 +
∑
i ψ(i, Bidst)
Figure 9 illustrates the price impact associated with coupling-induced
inventory oscillations. The results of two numerical simulations are shown,
with graphs set out in two rows — the top row is an example oscillation
causing market price to rise, and the bottom row is an example causing price
to drop. In each row there are three graphs showing, from left to right, the
market maker inventories, the Net Liquidity Pressure, and the market price.
Each simulation comprises a market with an exchange and five heteroge-
neous market makers (with different inventory limits, different pricing and
sizing functions, and where messages to the exchange are randomised at each
time step), and a delay in trade confirmations of just one time step (δ = 1).
19Menkveld (2013) observes that prices are negatively correlated with HFT inventories.
20The “1+” in the denominator addresses the case where there is no resting liquidity.
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In both cases, we assume that prior to the start of the simulation at least one
market maker has been induced to panic, and that the fundamental trader
has now withdrawn from the market. Thus, whatever happens to the price
during these simulations is not due to any fundamental trading — it can only
be due to the trading between the market makers themselves.
For the upper simulation, two market makers start with inventories in
negative panic and the rest have zero inventories: for the lower simulation,
two market makers start with inventories in positive panic and the rest have
zero inventories. In both cases, the inventories are highly unstable with
repeated phase switches into and out of panic (both positive and negative
panics). The net liquidity pressure for the upper simulation is mostly posi-
tive, and the rightmost graph shows that market prices rise by about 50% in
500 time steps (equivalent to about 100ms); the net liquidity pressure for the
lower simulation is mostly negative, and the rightmost graph shows market
prices dropping by about 40% over the same timescale.
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Figure 9: Coupling-induced heterogeneous inventory oscillation, net liquidity pressure,
and market prices for two simulations (upper row and lower row). UL and LL are the
limits for the trader with the largest limits and UL = -LL for all traders.
The results of Figure 9 indicate that if market makers are induced to
trade amongst themselves while other traders exit from the market, then a
rapid and appreciable impact on price (up or down) is theoretically possible.
Finally, Figure 10 recreates the price behaviour during the Flash Crash
of 2010, using public data wherever possible (CFTC-SEC, 2010; Kirilenko
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Figure 10: Comparison of E-Mini futures price drop during 3 minutes of the Flash Crash
(from 14:42.30 to 14:45.27) with 12 oscillating HFTs, opportunistic and other traders.
et al., 2010; Nanex, 2010a). Our simulation uses known factors such as the
net HFT inventory, total contracts traded within the selected 3 minutes,
and the reported mixture of HFT and Opportunistic traders, but there is
insufficient public data available for a detailed model and other factors must
be assumed or estimated.
Even with very limited public data, our model of dynamic coupling and
feedback provides a reasonable approximation to the key price dynamics.
Figure 10 illustrates that it is possible to use a low-level dynamic interaction
model during hypothesis formulation for understanding real events.
Mimicking the price movements of the Flash Crash is not new (e.g. Pad-
drik et al. (2012)), but our approach has the benefit that it is amenable to
formal analysis. We have given some examples of analysis in this article, and
we are developing more sophisticated techniques.
6. Conclusion
We have demonstrated how coupling between trading algorithms (espe-
cially HFTs) can destabilize markets, and have introduced a new technique
for modelling dynamic interaction at varying levels of abstraction. Our case
study has shown how unexpected latency and feedback may trigger instabil-
ity as an unintentional emergent behaviour.
The concept of “coupling” (including static, dynamic and time-dependent
coupling) has been defined as a bilateral behavioural dependency between
subsystems of a market, where a “subsystem” has been defined inductively
to be a single component or an entity comprising other subsystems. We have
then defined feedback loops in terms of cyclic chains of couplings, and these
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definitions underlie our ability to describe a wide variety of market feedback
behaviour at multiple levels of detail, and specifically our ability to model
dynamic interaction at the level of the market microstructure.
We have introduced a general framework for modelling dynamic interac-
tion and feedback, where recurrence relations in discrete time are used to
express the precise nature of bilateral couplings. Our dynamic interaction
models are at a sufficiently low level to express and reason about mechanistic
causality, yet are highly flexible in that different parts of the model can be
at different levels of detail. The framework also supports the precise expres-
sion of communication latencies. We have demonstrated how such models
can be used during hypothesis formulation and can be analysed to provide
understanding of the causes and triggers of feedback and prerequisites for
instability. We have also shown how we use numerical simulation to track
the time-varying value of a specific variable such as market price, based on
a set of starting conditions and a set of recurrence relations to describe a
given market; this provides a further way to analyse the feedback dynamics
of a particular model, and we have used this to show how low-level instabil-
ity in the microstructure of a market can cause high-level instability such as
crashes and spikes in market price.
We have explored unexpected latency (“delay”) as an example trigger for
feedback instability; this has been illustrated with a case study using simple,
stable, HFT market makers with inventory constraints in an order-book mar-
ket. We have expained how dynamic coupling between the HFTs (via the
order book) leads to a feedback loop, and how delays can then induce these
stable algorithms into an oscillatory instability, phase-shifting with precisely
anti-correlated synchrony into and out of inventory panic (“hot potato” trad-
ing). We have also shown how coupling-induced feedback between HFTs can
be self-exciting — in the absence of other effects, it can lead to a theoretically
infinite instability. These effects are induced by the size of delay relative to
the frequency of trading; thus, because short delays occur much more fre-
quently than long delays, HFTs are more likely to suffer from these effects
than low-frequency traders. In broader terms, our analysis suggests that in-
stability can arise as an unintentional emergent behaviour of markets; i.e. it
arises not as a consequence of algorithm complexity or predatory behaviour,
but instead as a result of transitive interaction effects. Such emergent insta-
bility can arise for a wide range of heretogeneous algorithms with differing
order-pricing and order-sizing functions, and is considerably more complex
than a simple “resonance” effect. Although we would not expect feedback
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loops to cause major market instability during equilibrium trading (due to
the large mix of strategies (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013) and because trades
within a feedback loop would be outnumbered by other trades), we do expect
feedback to become dominant at times of market breakdown when there are
fewer traders, and fewer and more correlated trades.
We believe that the concept of feedback as a cyclic chain of bilateral
couplings is essential to understanding emergent instability from stable com-
ponents. Further, we find that the creation of dynamic interaction models
based on recurrence relations is an extremely helpful technique in exploring
feedback dynamics, to be used alongside other methods during hypothesis
formulation. We have not demonstrated how large-scale dynamic interaction
models can be constructed and analysed, and clearly there are important
issues still to be resolved such as determining how to analyse a very large
market model to determine whether (and how many) feedback loops exist, to
compare the relative importance or strength of different feedback loops, and
how likely a given market model is to suffer from feedback-induced instability.
Although our case study focuses on oscillation arising from the interaction
of HFT market makers, we suspect that many previously observed feedback
loops (Danielsson et al., 2012; Zigrand et al., 2012) may also be modelled
and analysed using our general framework. Our work may therefore help to
understand previously unexplained sources of volatility in financial markets;
it may also have implications for models of pricing and market impact, since
we demonstrate that traders do not necessarily have independence of action
and such models might need to account for unexpected coupling with other
traders.
From a practitioner perspective, our dynamic interaction models may
help to understand how algorithms and markets could be re-engineered to
improve stability. Since even stable algorithms may be subject to dynamic
feedback, traders might now decide to test their algorithms for vulnerability
to common modes of feedback instability; execution venues might now decide
to offer deterministic latency to improve stability, or to monitor feedback
effects and provide enhanced information to subscribers; and regulators might
decide to use feedback models to help anticipate the efficacy and consequences
of proposed regulation — especially during periods of disequilibrium, when
regulatory control can be particularly important.
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Appendix A. Definitions of functions
ψ()
The function ψ() is applied to a sequence of orders x and sums the sizes
of all those orders with trader identifier i. We use the notation for sequences
defined in Section 4.2.1, and we model each order as a quadruplet (a, b, c, d)
containing the type of order (a), the size of the order (b), the price of a limit
order (c) and the trader identifier (d). The function ψ() is defined as follows:
ψ(i, x) =
 {} if (x = {})b+ ψ(i, r) if (x = (a, b, c, d) : r) and (d = i)
ψ(i, r) if (x = (a, b, c, d) : r) and (d 6= i)
bidprice() and askprice()
bidprice() and askprice() calculate the prices of resting limit orders. The
prices are varied linearly according to the current inventory (the aim is that
inventory should be zero-reverting). The functions each take the same three
arguments — the best bid, the best ask, and the inventory. The bid price is
greatest when the inventory is smallest (we set bidprice = midprice−1 when
inventory is LL+1), and the ask price is lowest when inventory is highest (we
set askprice = midprice + 1 when inventory is UL − 1). We set bidprice =
midprice− 1− ζ when inventory is UL− 1 and askprice = midprice+ 1 + ζ
when inventory is LL+ 1, where ζ is arbitrarily chosen (e.g. we use half the
CME price band), and we ensure prices do not become negative.
bidprice(bb, ba, inv) = max(0, ((ba+ bb)/2)− 1− ζ × (1− UL−1−invUL−LL−2 ))
askprice(bb, ba, inv) = max(0, ((ba+ bb)/2) + 1 + ζ × (UL−1−invUL−LL−2 ))
insertask() and insertbid()
These functions insert a sequence of new orders (argument z) into an
orderbook sequence (argument x). The orderbook must be sorted to en-
sure price-time ordering: the first order has the lowest price for askbook
and the highest price for bidbook. We use the notation introduced in Sec-
tion 4.2.1 for sequences. As explained above, orders are quadruplets — e.g.
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(type, size, price, id). The definition below is for insertask(): the definition
for insertbid() is identical except that the relational tests are reversed.
insertask(x, z) =

x if (z = {})
insertask({a}, y) if (x = {})
and (z = a : y)
insertask((τ, σ, pi, i) : x, y) if (x = (d, e, f, g) : q)
and (z = (τ, σ, pi, i) : y)
and (pi < f)
(d, e, f, g) : (insertask(q, z)) if (x = (d, e, f, g) : q)
and (z = (τ, σ, pi, i) : y)
and (pi ≥ f)
match()
The function match() takes a sequence of limit orders (l) and a sequence
of market orders (m), and returns a triple containing (i) a revised sequence of
limit orders (after executed orders have been deleted, and partial executions
amended), (ii) a sequence of executed limit orders, and (iii) a sequence of
executed market orders. We either denote an order by a single letter “x” or
by a quadruplet “(a, b, c, d)” to access its components. The definition (which
discards unmatched market orders) follows the structure of Equation 5.
match(l,m) =

({}, {}, {}) if (l = {})
(l, {}, {}) if (m = {})
(i, (a, f, c, d) : j,
(e, f, g, h) : k) if (l = (a, b, c, d) : q)
and (m = (e, f, g, h) : z)
and f < b
and (i, j, k) =
match((a, b− f, c, d) : q, z)
(i, (a, b, c, d) : j,
(e, b, g, h) : k) if (l = (a, b, c, d) : q)
and (m = (e, f, g, h) : z)
and f > b
and (i, j, k) =
match(q, (e, f − b, g, h) : z)
(i, (a, b, c, d) : j,
(e, b, g, h) : k) if (l = (a, b, c, d) : q)
and (m = (e, f, g, h) : z)
and f = b
and (i, j, k) = match(q, z)
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